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Being and implication: 
on Hegel and tHe greeks
andrew Haas
AbstrAct: this work shows that being must originally be understood as implication. We begin 
with what Heidegger calls Hegel’s ‘new concept of being’ in the Phenomenology of  Spirit: time as 
history is the essence of being. this concept however, is not univocal—for supersession means 
destroying-preserving. Hegel shows himself to be the thinker of truth as essentially ambiguous; 
and the Phenomenology is onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, the history of the being and unity, 
time and aspect, of the concept’s ambiguity. For Heidegger however, conceptual ambiguity 
confirms that Hegel’s history of being is stuck in a vulgar interpretation of time; and the 
Phenomenology can explain neither the origin of this time, nor the necessity of negation for the 
historical determination of being—for Hegel cannot think the ground of the concept of being, 
that is, the grounding of the ground. if Heidegger argues however, that the Phenomenology is pre-
determined by its ancient point of departure, we must go back to the greeks, back to aristotle’s 
original insight (overlooked by the entire history of philosophy as metaphysics): being and unity 
imply one another—for they are essentially implications. thus the question of the meaning of 
being becomes the question of the meaning of implication.
Keywords: ambiguity; aristotle; aspect; Being; concept; Hegel; Heidegger; History; 
implication; phenomenology; time; Unity
ei dē to on kai to hen tauton kai mia phusis tō akolouthein allēlois 
hōsper archē kai aition… 
if being and unity are the same and are one thing in the sense that 
they are implied in one another as principle and cause are… 
—aristotle, Metaphysics, 1003b22-24.
a new concept of being, a neuer Seinsbegriff, that ‘complies with the meaning of the 
absolute concept of being’ (Hps 141/203)1—this is what Heidegger thinks Hegel’s Phe-
     1. martin Heidegger, Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. p. emad and k. maly, Bloomington, indiana, 
1994, p. 141 (henceforth Hps; the corresponding german page number from vol. 32 of the collected works 
of Heidegger, Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, Frankfurt an main, klostermann, 1980, is given after the 
slash /).
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nomenology of  Spirit develops. But if this concept is new, it is because it is old, as old as 
Western metaphysics. and Hegel is merely unfolding the essential motifs of the greeks, 
bringing the question ‘ti to on’ to completion. the science of the phenomenology of spirit 
is therefore, ‘nothing other than the fundamental-ontology of  absolute ontology, or onto-logy in 
general’ (Hps 141/204).2
so what is this new concept of being? it is the concept itself, der Begriff. But the con-
cept for Hegel is not simply an abstract idea or category, nor an immediate intuition of 
simple natures, nor is it merely a subjective thought or function of consciousness—for it is 
just as much concrete and objective, substance and subject—the concept is the absolute 
idea of absolute spirit. Being is absolute spirit, and the absolute idea is its concept. But if 
being is the concept, then absolute spirit is the absolute idea. and the phenomenology of 
spirit is the development of being as the concept; it is the comprehended or conceptual 
history, begriffene Geschichte, of absolute spirit as it comes to absolute knowledge of itself 
as absolute idea, ‘spirit that knows itself as spirit’ (ps ¶ 808/gW iX 531).3 then if the 
concept is Hegel’s new concept of being, history is the concept of the concept, Begriff des 
Begriffes (sl 582/gW Xii 11).4 as Heidegger insists: if spirit’s knowledge is historical his-
tory, the concept of being is temporal, and ‘the problematic of “being and time” already 
exists in Hegel’ (Hps 144/208).5 
But what then is the temporality of being, of the historical concept, of the absolute 
idea of absolute knowledge? For Heidegger, it is that ‘being is the essence of time; be-
     2. Heidegger continues: insofar as the ‘being of beings is determined as eidos, idea, idea, and thus related to 
seeing, knowing, and logos’, philosophy is always idealism; and the phenomenology of spirit is ‘the deliber-
ate, explicit, and absolute justification of idealism’ (Hps 141-2/204); see Hegel, g. W. F., Phänomenologie des 
Geistes, W. Bonsiepen and r. Heede (eds.), Hamburg, Felix meiner, 1980, p. 132ff (Gesammelte Werke, Band 
iX, henceforth gW iX). For the interpretation that Hegel’s thought is ‘not just an epistemological truth; it 
reflects the ontological one’, see charles taylor, ‘the opening arguments of the phenomenology’ in Hegel, 
a. macintyre (ed.), notre dame, University of notre dame, 1972, p. 166. For the view that the phenom-
enology ‘rests on the difference between knowledge and being’, see Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of  
Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. s. cherniak and J. Heckman, evanston, northwestern University, 1974, 
p. 578.
     3. Hegel, g. W. F., The Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. a. V. miller, new York, oxford, 1977, ¶ 808 (hence-
forth ps). as Hyppolite argues: ‘Whereas in sensuous certainty the immediate is, in the last chapter it has 
come to be what it is: it has actualized itself through an internal mediation. in the first chapter, truth and 
certainty are immediately equal; in the last chapter, certainty, i.e., subjectivity, has posed itself in being, 
posed itself as truth, and truth, i.e., objectivity, has shown itself to be certainty, self-consciousness’, Genesis 
and Structure of  Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, pp. 81-2.
     4. Hegel, g. W. F., Science of  Logic, trans. a. V. miller, new Jersey, Humanities press, 1997 (henceforth 
sl); Hegel, g. W. F., Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Band. Die objektive Logik (1812/13), Friedrich Hogemann 
und Walter Jaeschke (eds.), Hamburg, Felix meiner, 1978; Wissenschaft der Logik. Zweiter Band. Die subjektive 
Logik (1816), Friedrich Hogemann und Walter Jaeschke (eds.), Hamburg, Felix meiner, 1981; Wissenschaft der 
Logik. Erster Band. Die Lehre vom Sein (1832), Friedrich Hogemann und Walter Jaeschke (eds.), Hamburg, Felix 
meiner, 1984. (these editions are from Gesammelte Werke, Bands Xi, Xii and XXi respectively: henceforth 
gW Xi, gW Xii and gW XXi). see also F. W. J. schelling, System des transzendentalen Idealismus, Hamburg, 
meiner, 1992, p. 15.
     5. see also Being and Time, trans. J. stambaugh, new York, sUnY, 1996, §82 (henceforth Bt).
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ing, namely, qua infinity’ (Hps 145/209).6 time is finite; being is infinite—for ‘time is 
one appearance of the simple essence of being qua infinity’ (Hps 145/209). Beings appear 
in time, as temporal, in the ‘shape of space’ (ps ¶ 169), thanks to the infinity of being, 
thanks to the concept of infinite history.
Heidegger’s thesis in response to the problematic of being and time however, is the 
exact opposite of Hegel’s: being is not the essence of time—rather, ‘time is the original 
essence of being’ (Hps 146/211). But is being the essence of time for Hegel? or is it 
rather that history is the essence of being? does the Phenomenology not demonstrate that 
the essence of being is historical spirit? What then happens to time? and to being? or 
if Hegel’s concept of being is, as Heidegger insists, ‘as old as Western philosophy’ (Hps 
141/204),7 as old as the greeks, must we not look to them in order to think the original 
meaning of being, and of time?
on Hegel’s concept oF Being
regardless, Hegel’s new concept of being, the concept of the concept, is history. and 
this is the essence of time. But what is the concept of history? it is neither just one event 
after another, ‘free contingent happening’, the empirical fact of change or substantial 
development, nor the externalization of a self, the kenosis of subjectivity in space and 
time; rather it is the becoming of being. For the history of the concept of being is the 
unity, the Einheit, of its being and its negation, itself and its other, nothing.8 and the his-
torical concept of being—itself a contradictio in adjecto—the goal of the phenomenology of 
absolute spirit’s absolute knowledge, is the history of the absolute idea, of the becoming 
of spirit.
time as historical then, is the truth of the Phenomenology—for here the unfolding of 
the concept of being is a reciprocally necessary movement, the progressive development 
     6. Heidegger’s thesis with respect to being and time is no thesis at all; on the contrary, it is a question, a 
question that asks for the meaning of being, and its relation to time. against Hegel, Heidegger is concerned 
with renewing the question of ontology, the question of being, its logos, method and content. philosophy 
therefore, as an attempt to raise (or re-raise) being to the status of a question—not find a new answer—‘is 
not a science’ (Hps 12/18). the extent to which Heidegger, by raising the question of the meaning of being 
to the status of a question, fails in this attempt to raise ‘the question of the question’, is raised by Jacques der-
rida, De l’esprit, paris, galilée, 1987, p. 24. the extent to which the question, or the question of the question, 
is far more an answer, or an attack, see my The Irony of  Heidegger, london, continuum, 2007.
     7. owing to space restrictions, i will limit my consideration of Heidegger’s texts to those that explicitly deal 
with Hegel, as an attempt to do justice to Heidegger’s thought with respect to being is beyond the scope of 
this paper.
     8. as Hegel writes in the Logic: ‘Pure being and pure nothing is therefore the same. What the truth is, is neither 
being nor nothing, but that being—does not go-over—but has gone-over into nothing, and nothing into 
being. But the truth is equally not their undifferentiatedness, but that they are not the same, that they are ab-
solutely different, and equally unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. their 
truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: becoming, a movement 
in which both are differentiated, but through a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself ’ 
(sl 82-83/ gW XXi 72); translation modified. For a discussion of the relation between being, nothing and 
becoming, see for example, michael inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, london, Blackwell, 1992, p. 44ff.
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of absolute spirit. and truth means: conceptual truth, the unity of the philosophical 
system of science, of the whole of life, of self and other, substance and subject. indeed, 
the truth of the concept is double, free from one-sidedness, Einseitigkeit. and the gestalt 
of the concept therefore, cannot be posited as predication or subsumption, but as Aufhe-
bung, the supersession that both preserves and destroys contradiction, the going-under 
that is a going-over, Untergang that is an Übergang, a decline that is far more transition. 
Hegel thus insists that like aufgeben, aufheben is ambiguous ‘to give, like to supersede, two-
meanings: a) to give up—to view it as lost, destroyed; b) [to give]—but even therewith 
simultaneously, to make it into a problem, whose content is not destroy; but which is saved 
and whose distortion is a difficulty to be solved’ (W Xi 574).9 if the truth of the concept is 
essentially ambiguous, it is because supersession has two-meanings simultaneously—not 
simply one, nor the other, nor their combination, but both.10
the time of the concept then, is ‘at the same time;’ the gestalt of Aufhebung shows 
itself to be that of the zugleich. in this way, Hegel thinks the temporality of truth—not 
simply as finite or infinite, true or false, but both simultaneously. and it is this time that 
allows truth to show itself as temporal, as progressive, self-unfolding; just as it is this time 
that lets the concept appear as sequential, now one-sided, then two-sided (ps ¶ 5).11 the 
ambiguity that simultaneously maintains and destroys ambiguity—this is the temporal 
truth of the concept. and an ambiguity that was not simultaneous (and simultaneously 
both ambiguous and non-ambiguous), would be no ambiguity at all. But if ambiguity is 
the essence of conceptual truth, of that which shows itself in the form of simultaneous 
time; this time is that of the now: both meanings are now and always. presence and 
infinity are the markers of the Hegelian concept—for they are the essential time of its 
ambiguity. and if the Phenomenology, is the science of the concept of being (ontology), it is 
just as much the science of the temporality of its ambiguity (chronology).
But the problem of the truth of the concept’s ambiguity does not stop with onto-
chronology; rather, as Hegel insists: ‘truth is complete only in the unity of  identity with differ-
ence, and hence consists only in this unity’ (sl 414/gW Xi 30).12 this however is not 
     9. ‘aufgeben, wie aufheben, doppelsinnig: a) aufgeben—es als verloren, vernichtet betrachten; b) 
[aufgeben]—eben damit aber zugleich es zum problem machen, dessen gehalt nicht vernichtet ist, 
sondern der gerettet und dessen Verkümmerung, schwierigkeit zu lösen ist’, g. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwanz-
ing Bänden, eva moldenhauer and karl markus (eds.), Frankfurt am main, suhrkamp Verlag, 1969, Band 
Xi, aphorism 52, p. 574, emphasis and translation aH (henceforth W); cf. sl 116/gW XXi 104.
     10. But that which drives the science of phenomenology by refusing to disambiguate the ambiguity of its 
truth, by resisting any reduction of incompleteness to completeness, or two-sidedness to one-sidedness—
this is what Hegel names ‘the tremendous power of the negative’. Here the ambiguity (of opposition, Streit, 
polemos) is maintained, kept, preserved—for this is the magical-force, Zauberkraft, that returns spirit to being 
(ps ¶ 32).
     11. Hegel uses a multiplicity of metaphors for two-sidedness—just one example: ‘the Bacchanalian revel in 
which no member is not drunk’ (ps ¶ 47). i have attempted to think this problem in my, ‘the Bacchanalian 
revel: Hegel and deconstruction’, Man and World, vol. 30, no. 2, 1997, pp. 217-26.
     12. see also, sl 431-443/gW Xi 50-64. Here, identity is essentially that which it is only as difference, 
just as difference is essentially identity. the predicative language therefore, that philosophy has taken up 
from aristotle to kant, is no longer appropriate for Hegel; rather, if philosophy is to direct itself towards 
science, we must now begin to think and speak according to speculative propositions. as Hegel insists: 
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simply the abstract or non-conceptual unity of which Hegel accuses everyone, from 
parmenides to leibniz (god as the monadas monadum) and Fichte (a=a or i=i)—for it is 
not the ‘original or immediate unity as such’ in which, as the saying goes, ‘all cows are 
black’; on the contrary, it is the ‘unity of being and nothing’, the ‘unity of differentiated-
ness and non-differentiatedness’ (ps ¶ 16; sl 74/gW XXi 63).13 Here, ‘all multiplicity is 
included in the unity’ (W XX 243/lHp iii 335). and difference is not simply destroyed 
in indistinguishability and undifferentiatedness, but aufgehoben (W XX 255/lHp iii 
348). the ambiguity of unity therefore shows itself as the ‘process of its own becoming’ 
the circular becoming of itself, Werden seiner selbst, in which the beginning is the end (ps 
¶ 18). and as a unity, the new concept of being is temporally one, a unity or whole, das 
Ganze. as Hegel insists: ‘the true is the whole’—for its essence, ‘what it is in truth’, con-
sists in being its own becoming, sich selbst Werden, zu sein (ps ¶ 20 trans. modified). the 
temporal ambiguity of the concept receives a new determination: as the unity of being 
and becoming, it is now and then, present and absent, infinite and finite. thus if the 
science of the Phenomenology is onto-chronology it is also the science of unity (henology); 
it is onto-heno-chronology.
But we cannot even stop there—for truth must be complete, vollständig. and the 
completion of truth is not a function of time; rather, the concept is one as completely 
ambiguous. completeness or incompleteness are ways in which ambiguity shows itself 
to be one at any time whatsoever, the aspect or eidos of time.14 in addition to its time, 
‘Formally, what has been said can be expressed thus: the general nature of the judgment or proposition, 
which involves the distinction of subject and predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition, and the 
proposition of identity which the former becomes contains the counter-thrust against that subject-predicate 
relationship.—this conflict between the general form of a proposition and the unity of the concept which 
destroys it is similar to the conflict that occurs in rhythm between meter and accent.  rhythm results from 
the floating center and the unification of the two.  so, too, in the philosophical proposition the identification 
of subject and predicate is not meant to negate the difference between them, which the form of the propo-
sition expresses; their unity, rather, is meant to emerge as a harmony.  the form of the proposition is the 
appearance of the determinate sense, or the accent that distinguishes its fulfillment; but that the predicate 
expresses the substance, and that the subject itself falls into the universal, this is the unity in which the accent 
dies away’ (ps ¶ 61). the beginning is the ‘unity of being and nothing; or is non-being which is at the same 
time being, and being which is at the same time nothing’ (sl 73/gW XXi 62).
     13. see also g. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of  Philosophy, trans. e. s. Haldane and Frances H. simson, 
3 vols., lincoln, University of nebraska press, 1995, lHp iii 338/W XX 246 (henceforth lHp i, lHp ii 
and lHp iii). Heidegger’s (somehow motivated) assessment is somewhat at odds with Hegel’s: ‘even though 
Western philosophy up to Hegel has basically not gone beyond parmenides’ proposition: to on to hen, despite 
all the transformations, this does not signify a deficiency but a superiority and indicates that in spite of 
everything, it remains strong enough to preserve its original truth’, martin Heidegger, Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
Theta 1-3, trans. W. Brogan and p. Warnek, Bloomington, indiana, 1995, §3. see also, Hps 93-4/134 and 
Bt, §82(b).
     14. clearly, the linguistic concept of aspect is insufficient for an account of Hegelian (or transcendental, 
phenomenological, metaphysical) aspect, or for thinking the way in which beings are and are unified at one 
and the same time, or anytime. But nor is aspect just that which the science of metaphysics has taken as 
that which shows itself as itself, nor as another, like some kind of perspective or view, symptom or indica-
tion, nor an appearance of an appearance, nor that which disappears by appearing, because it is too dimly 
seen, nor because it is too much or many, but because in showing itself, it shows that it cannot be shown. 
and nor could it be merely a function of language, reason or time. rather aspect is implied by unity—and 
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now or then, the concept’s Aufhebung appears as essentially complete or incomplete.15 in 
other words, ambiguity’s simultaneity, must be supplemented in order to show itself as 
the present (or past or future) system of science. so too philosophy—actually or poten-
tially, as well as always or sometimes—becomes knowing or not. as Hegel insists: the 
true system of science must understand the diversity of philosophical systems as ‘the 
progressive unfolding of truth’—for the fortschritende Entwicklung der Wahrheit is the aspectual 
essence of the concept, aspectually actual as self-moving, being as becoming, complete 
qua incomplete; and its ambiguity exhibits progressive aspect (ps ¶ 2, emphasis added). 
so too, if absolute spirit appears as an ambiguous phainomenon (substance and subject, 
other-being and being-for-self, das Andersein und Fürsichsein); it is because this ‘most sub-
lime concept’ remains completely incomplete, that is, aspectually complete as incom-
plete.16 thus just as unity is being’s other; so too aspect shows itself (phainesthai) as the 
other of time. and if the Phenomenology of  Spirit is onto-heno-chronology, it is always also 
the science of aspect (phenomenology); so onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, or just 
thus can a unified being show its aspect as left or right, up and down, present or absent, relative or abso-
lute, concealed/revealed. But if something could be one or be itself or another at one and the same time, 
although not in the same way, it is because of aspect. then the unity of being (or of a being) would have to 
be aspectually complete or incomplete so that it could show itself in any way whatsoever, could present this 
face or that, this perspective or that side, so that it could be before or after in this way or another, or even 
so that it could be something rather than nothing. For the linguistic concept of aspect see, for example, r. 
Binnick, Time and the Verb, oxford, oxford University, 1991, or B. comrie, Aspect, cambridge, cambridge 
University, 1976.
     15. aristotle thinks aspect as complete or incomplete through the difference of peras and telos, limit and 
end, kinēsis and energeia, movement and actuality (an aspectual difference that Hegel rearticulates in terms of 
that which is in itself, an sich, for itself, für sich, or in and for itself, an und für sich (ps ¶ 21 and ¶ 25)—for the 
difference between actions cannot be taken into account merely through a difference in time. this becomes 
obvious when attempting to articulate the difference between actions done at the same time (‘i ate’ and ‘i 
was eating’). But for aristotle, this difference is one of metaphysical aspect (although the extent to which 
this difference can be maintained has yet to be established), and the proper place to investigate it is within 
the Metaphysics, the science of being qua being, to on hē on: ‘since of the actions which have a limit none is an 
end but all are relative to the end, e.g. the removing of fat, or fat-removal, and the bodily parts themselves 
when one is making them thin are in movement in this way (i.e. without being already that at which the 
movement aims), this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is not an end); but that movement 
in which the end is present is an action. e.g. at the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understand-
ing and have understood, are thinking and have thought (while it is not true that at the same time we are 
learning and have learnt, or are being cured and have been cured). at the same time we are living well 
and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy. if not, the process would have had to cease, as 
the process of making think ceases: but, as things are, it does not cease; we are living and have lived. of 
these processes, then, we must call the one set movements, and the other actualities. For every movement 
is incomplete—making thin, learning, walking, building; these are movements, and incomplete at that. For 
it is not true that at the same time a thing is walking and has walked, or is building and has built, or is com-
ing to be and has come to be, or is being moved and has been moved, but what is being moved is different 
from what has been moved, and what is moving from what has moved. But it is the same thing that at the 
same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. the latter sort of process, then, i call an 
actuality, and the former a movement’, Metaphysics, 1048b18-34, in The Basic Works of  Aristotle, ed. and trans. 
W. d. ross, new York, random House, 1941, pp. 826-827 (henceforth Meta.).
     16. as Hegel insists: ‘everything turns on grasping and expressing the true, not only as substance, but 
equally as subject’ (ps ¶ 17; see also ¶ 25).
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phenomenology for short.
as a science then, phenomenology remains completely incomplete, finished as un-
finished—and the Phenomenology is the attempt (essentially unfinished, that is, finished as 
unfinishable) to lead the individual to knowledge, ‘to be able to lay aside the title love of  
wisdom and be actual wisdom’ (ps ¶ 5, trans. modified; and ps ¶ 28). But as Hegel insists: 
this attempt is only a goal, Ziel; it is only proposed, vorgesetzt—for philosophy can only 
get closer, naher, to actual knowing insofar as its actuality consists in never being actual-
ized, or in being actualized as unactualizable.17 in this (perfectly socratic) sense, the love 
of wisdom becomes actual wisdom, knowing that we do not know, not because we do 
not yet know, but because we cannot know. so too, if the task of raising consciousness 
through self-consciousness to the position of spirit, like the trajectory of each reader, is 
always only a task, an Aufgabe, it is because it is achieved as unachieved, outstanding as 
outstanding, complete as incompleteable.18 it is no surprise then, that the Phenomenology 
ends in complete incompleteness, in the absolutely ambiguous concept, der absolute Beg-
riff, in the four-fold ambiguity of absolute spirit’s absolute knowing.19
First the time of the absolute concept is that of the past, of recollection, remember-
ing, Erinnerung, the memory of spirit’s becoming, the self-mediating process that ‘is there’ 
as emptied out into time, and presents itself as a ‘slow-moving succession of spirits, a 
gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of spirit, moves thus slowly 
just because the self has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance’ (ps ¶ 
808).20 But as Hegel insists: recollection is essentially, inwardizing, Er-Innerung, preserv-
ing inside that which is lost outside, keeping that which cannot be kept, representing 
(that is, re-representing, even misrepresenting) past experience as present, present past. 
conceptual preservation however, means: that which is preserved is both preserved and 
destroyed—for aufbewahren is as ambiguous as aufgeben and aufheben. and the goal, das Ziel 
     17. similarly, Hegel insists that ‘spirit’s insight into what knowing is’, into the being of knowledge, is itself 
only a goal, Ziel (ps ¶ 29). as a goal however, a Ziel, the end of the Phenomenology of  Spirit remains essentially 
uncertain—a goal is both that which is achieved, accomplished, completed, aimed at, a target, boundary, 
limit or horizon, as well as that which is not achieved, or completed, but left to be completed, hence incom-
plete. appropriately, ‘goal’ means both the end and the beginning of a race. on the one hand, an achieved 
goal is no longer a goal; on the other hand, the goal is only achieved qua goal as unachieved—perhaps 
unachieveable. 
     18. on the structure of the task, see Walter Benjamin, ‘the task of the translator’, Selected Writings, m. 
Bullock and m. W. Jennings (eds.), vol. 1, cambridge, Harvard University, 1996.
     19. and this truth is, for Hegel, no longer expressed as subject and predicate, but in a speculative proposi-
tion, the absolutely mediated identity of its existence with its essence in which their difference is no longer 
one of form, but of content (ps ¶ 37, ¶ 61, ¶ 808).
     20. Hegel writes: ‘time is the concept itself that is there and which presents itself to consciousness as empty 
intuition; therefore spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time as long as it has not grasped its 
pure concept, that is, has not annulled time. it is the outer, intuited pure self which is not grasped by the self, 
the merely intuited concept; insofar as this latter grasps itself, it supersedes its time-form, conceptualizes 
this intuiting, and is a conceptualized and conceptualizing intuiting. time therefore appears as the fate and 
necessity of spirit that is not yet complete within itself ’ (ps ¶ 801, trans. modified). thus with respect to 
spirit: regarded as ‘free existence appearing in the form of contingency’, spirit is differentiated as history, the 
becoming in time of spirits; regarded as a conceptual organization, spirits belong to the science of appearing 
knowledge (ps ¶ 808).
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(always just a goal), of the Phenomenology, absolute knowing, spirit’s recollection of spirits, 
is only completed insofar as it knows it cannot be complete—the lost qua lost cannot be 
found. For this reason, preservation, Aufbewahrung, is on the one hand, historical becom-
ing, contingency, forgetting, the past qua past, recollecting what is un-recollectable; on 
the other hand, it is science, ahistorical being, necessary, the past qua present, recollect-
ing that it is un-recollectable—a recollection that is itself always recollectable, infinitely 
present. thus the time of memory, its success and its failure, its success as failure and its 
failure as success, the ambiguity of the presence of the past, is the time of the Phenomenol-
ogy’s absolute concept.
But second, the time of this concept, the ambiguity of memory, of recollection and 
preservation—this has its other in the aspect of the absolute concept. as Hegel writes: 
spirit’s ‘fulfillment consists in perfectly knowing what it is’; its completion, Vollendung, 
lies in knowing its substance (ps ¶ 808). But this aspectual completion is itself ambigu-
ous: spirit, on the one hand, knows that it knows itself; on the other hand, it knows that 
it does not and cannot know itself—an ignorance that it recollects and preserves as 
ignorance. the speed of its becoming (slow, draggy, sluggish, languid, träge), the way 
in which spirits follow one another in successive time, is just one indication of spirit’s 
incomplete knowledge—for in motion, becoming, emptied out into time, it can never be 
completely present to knowing. so in the Phenomenology, history means that spirit appears 
with incomplete aspect—but science means that this incompleteness of appearing has 
complete aspect. and aspectual ambiguity therefore, the ambiguity of complete incom-
pleteness, is the essence of conceptual history.
third however, if the absolute concept can show itself temporally and aspectually, 
it is because it is a unity—not a simple, immediate, one-sided unity of substance or sub-
ject, thought and being, or thought and time, but the mediated unity of both, or what 
Hegel names ‘the concept in its truth, namely, in unity with its externalization’ (ps ¶ 
795 and ¶ 803).21 indeed, at the end of the Phenomenology, absolute spirit completes itself 
with the unity of the absolute concept—but this is a unity that ambiguously preserves 
difference, as well as its difference from difference. Hegel insists: ‘in this knowing then, 
spirit has concluded the movement of its shapes insofar as it is imprisoned with the 
insurmounted difference of consciousness’ (ps ¶ 805, trans. modified). the concept’s 
identity is locked together with difference; unity is burdened with its negation, disunity, 
and with the historical movement of its own moments. and for this reason, the history 
of the concept is the unity of historical and scientific knowing—not one, nor the other, 
nor some third, but the two together, beide zusammen, the unifying relationship of both 
in which neither is alone, that in which subject and substance are one insofar as their 
difference is preserved (ps ¶ 808). thus conceptual unity is essentially ambiguous: on 
the one hand, unitary unity, non-differentiated; on the other hand, differentiated, non-
unitary unity. 
     21. as Hegel writes: here, the concept’s ‘negative attitude to objectivity is just as much positive’ (ps ¶ 801). 
For Heidegger, Hegel is here universalizing kant’s psychologistic-subjectivistic principle of the understand-
ing (Hps 83/118).
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the time and aspect and unity then, of the absolute concept—but this means, 
fourth: ‘the concept has become the element of existence’, the truth of being (ps ¶ 798). 
so the concept of being as existence, Dasein, is both the beginning and the end of the 
Phenomenology. But this also means that the existence of the concept is ambiguous: on the 
one hand, being means presencing, being-there, being-present, in time, with incomplete 
aspect, as disunified; on the other hand, it means conceptualizing, being there and here, 
present and absent, in and out of time, with completely incomplete aspect, as a unity. in 
this way, ‘to be’ means ‘to conceptualize’, aufheben. and if asked ‘What is?’ and ‘What is 
being?’, Hegel would respond: the concept is, and the concept of the concept is being. 
so too with beings—for a being is, is that which it is, and how it is, in relation to its 
concept; just as being is in relation to its concept. Being then, is both the destruction and 
preservation of beings. and ‘to be’ means ‘to be ambiguous’; being is ambiguating—or 
more precisely, ambiguity is Hegel’s new concept of being.
time is tHe essence oF Being: Heidegger’s Hegel
For Heidegger however, the thought of being as ambiguity does not dispute, but far 
more confirms the thesis that, for Hegel, being is the essence of time. and this means 
that, as ‘an appearance of being’, time disappears on the royal road to the conceptual 
history of absolute spirit (Hps 145/209).22 if Hegel’s concept of history then, remains 
dependent upon what Heidegger calls the common or vulgäre understanding of time, it 
does not supersede but merely repeats the fundamental presuppositions of the Western 
metaphysical tradition. as Heidegger insists: Hegelian time is not simply the other of 
space, the number of motion, arithmos kinēseōs, with respect to before and after;23 nor is it 
some kind of abstract form or empty vessel in which events occur; nor the transcenden-
tal schema of the pure concepts of understanding, the representation, Vorstellung, which 
‘mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category’24—rather as the de-
terminate negation, supersession, Aufhebung of both, it is coming into being and passing 
out of being, becoming, transition. as Hegel writes in the Encyclopedia: time ‘is being, 
that which is not insofar as it is, and is insofar as it is not’; time is the becoming of being. 
thus time appears as ‘intuited becoming’, angeschaute Werden, an abstract succession of 
     22. Heidegger’s interest in the concept of being in Hegel seems in contrast to nietzsche’s: ‘We germans 
are Hegelians even if there never had been any Hegel, insofar as we (in contrast to all latins) instinctively 
attribute a deeper sense and richer value to becoming, to development, than to what “is”—we hardly be-
lieve in the justification of the concept “being,”’ The Gay Science, trans. W. kaufmann, new York, random 
House, 1974, §357; trans. modified.
     23. aristotle, Physics, 219b1-2; see Bt, §82(a).
     24. immanuel kant, Critique of  Pure Reason, trans. n. k. smith, new York, st. martin’s, 1929, a139/B178. 
But as kant warns: ‘this schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their 
mere form, is an art concealed [eine verborgene Kunst] in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of 
activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze’, a141/B181. as 
augustine writes: ‘time is nothing more than distention’ of the mind, Confessions, trans. J. k. ryan, garden 
city, doubleday, 1960, Book Xi, ch. 26, p. 298.
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nows, a movement in which every now is in relation to no-longer-now or not-yet-now.25 
But primarily oriented on the now, only the present is; the past and future, before and 
after, are not—although as negations, they are posited as essential: ‘the being of time is 
the now’, and the being of the now is ‘the abstraction of consuming’ (Bt 431).
in Being and Time therefore, Heidegger suggests an interpretation of spirit’s progress 
not as Aufhebung, but as Überwindung, surmounting, overcoming, conquering, vanquish-
ing (Bt 434). For Hegel writes: ‘World-history in general is therefore the interpretation 
of spirit in time, just as the idea interprets itself in nature as space’ (Hegel in Bt 434, 
trans modified).26 the world-history of the ‘lectures on the philosophy of World-Histo-
ry’ however, Weltgeschichte, is precisely not the conceptual history, begriffne Geschichte, of the 
Phenomenology of  Spirit. still Heidegger insists: Hegel’s radical formulation of the ‘vulgar 
experience and interpretation of time’ (Bt 431) is necessary for the Phenomenology so that 
spirit can empty itself out, so that it can self-externalize itself as concrete. the finitude 
of time, the negation of the negation of spirit’s in-finity, is the condition of the possibility 
of any substantial history or Naturphilosophie whatsoever—for ‘history falls in time’, in die 
Zeit fällt (Bt 428, trans. modified).27 indeed, temporality is the power of the finite—but 
if it is also necessary for spirit, then ‘the power of time’, is just as much the power of the 
infinite (gW XX §258n; Bt 435). thus history falls into time so that Hegel can think—
as Heidegger notes—the concretion of spirit.
Heidegger then, has two basic questions for Hegel with respect to the connection 
between spirit and time—and this is no simple denial, refusal or rejection of the unity of 
subject and substance, nor of the ambiguity of being, but far more an attempt to make 
these questions questionable. First, what is the origin, the Ursprung, of this concept of 
leveled-down time? and second, is it possible to think the essential constitution of spirit 
in some way other than ‘as the negating of the negation’ (Bt 435)?
With respect to the origin of spirit’s fall into time, Heidegger quotes Hegel: ‘time ap-
pears as the very fate and necessity of spirit when it is not in itself complete’ (ps ¶ 801; 
Bt 435).28 indeed, Hegel thinks that, daß, quid facti, spirit shows itself in time; but not how, 
wie, quid juris, it does so, with what right the Phenomenology asserts that incompleteness 
necessarily implies the fall. so Heidegger does not dispute that history falls into time, 
but rather asks: What is the origin of this fate? and for Heidegger, Hegel’s thought of the 
essence of spirit, that it must fall into time in order to become that which it is, in order to 
     25. g. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), Wolfgang Bonsiepen 
und Hans-christian lucas (eds.), Hamburg, Felix meiner, 1992, §258-9 (henceforth gW XX). For Heide-
gger, this concept of time is the condition of the possibility of the punctuality of the point, of the being of 
the point in space (Bt §82(a)). For catherine malabou’s argument for a ‘plasticity of the Hegelian concept 
of time’, that is, for the ‘existence of several times’, plusieurs temps, in the Phenomenology, a ‘pluralité qui excède 
la seule distinction entre une temporalité vulgaire et une temporalité originaire’, see L’avenir de Hegel, paris, 
Vrin, 1996, p. 253.
     26. see g. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte I, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, Johannes 
Hoffmeister and georg lasson (eds.), Hamburg, Felix meiner, 1994, p. 154. 
     27. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte I, p. 153.
     28. Unfortunately stambaugh’s translation is here confused and the footnote numbering should be 40, 
not 38.
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preserve its completely incomplete ambiguity, does not answer the question of its origin; 
but rather far more poses it more profoundly. Hegel therefore fails to raise the ques-
tion of the origin of falling, of original fallenness, if he cannot think how spirit must be 
concretized as originally temporal, how the being of history is necessarily constituted by 
original temporality—for being is not the essence of time; time is the essence of being, 
and the temporality of time is the origin of the vulgar time into which spirit reveals itself 
as fallen (and temporality too is that which first makes the existence of us as dasein, as 
factially thrown, as fallen, first possible—for the origin of our way of being, existence, is 
the temporality of time as well). 
the essential constitution of spirit therefore can and must be thought in another 
way, not as the negation of the negation, but as that which first makes negation pos-
sible, namely, the ‘original temporalizing of temporality’ (Bt 436, trans. modified). Here 
Heidegger is attempting to think against Hegel’s metaphysical fidelity to spinoza’s omnis 
determinatio est negatio, to think the time of that which is determined by negation, as well 
as the being of determination and negation themselves.29 in other words, if determina-
tion needs time, happens in time, has a history, then the temporality of time must be 
presupposed as the essence of being. and negation occurs in time, the temporality of 
time—for not only is it, present or absent, always or not, but that which is negated, even 
the negation of the negation, and that means that they are temporal as well. Hegel then 
thinks time as that into which spirit empties itself, but for Heidegger, time is not some-
thing into which spirit can be emptied; it is the necessary fate of beings (and spirit is, as 
well) insofar as they are—for time gives being their way of being, as the temporality of 
time temporalizes factical existence, now and then, authentically or not, as contingent 
or necessary or conceptual history. But not just time—aspect as well—for that which lets 
spirit exist historically remains unthought; the continuous aspect or enduring presence 
of being, the perdurance or Austrag of the concept, its sustained completeness or incom-
pleteness, now and then, sometimes or always—all this remains in the background.30 
and not only time and aspect, but unity too—for the question of being’s (spirit’s) fate is 
simultaneously (time) ‘the question about beings as such and as a whole’ (id 54). so not 
merely time and aspect and unity, but being as well—for Hegel thinks spirit as being 
emptied out into time, as subject and substance, comprehending and conceptualizing 
its history—but thereby he does not think the being of this being qua being. in fact, in 
thinking being (not as a genus or generality, nor as mere form of human cognition) as 
spirit, indeterminate immediacy, absolute idea or absolute thinking, ‘imperishable life, 
     29. in fact, F. W. J. schelling suggests another kind of determination that is not negation: ‘with respect to 
this sort of determination, the saying determinatio est negatio does not in any way apply, since this is itself one 
with the position and concept of essence, thus actually the essence in which essence is’, Über das Wesen der 
menschlichen Freiheit, stuttgart, reclam, 1964, p. 101; translation aH. For Hegel’s discussion of negation in 
spinoza, see for example, sl 113/gW XXi 107.
     30. martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. J. stambaugh, chicago, University of chicago, 2002, p. 
46 (henceforth id). and not only being (not just being as another, but being itself, being qua being), but the 
difference between being and beings, and this difference qua difference. For if this difference is thought as 
another, as abstract or absolute, as diversity or multiplicity, as merely qualitative or quantitative, essential or 
conceptual—if it is interpreted in any of these ways, then Differenz as such has been overlooked. 
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self-knowing truth’ (sl 824/gW Xii 284), all truth, in thinking the truth of being as es-
sence, and the truth of essence as concept, even in the new concept of being, the concept 
of the concept, idea of the idea, history—in all this, the question of the being of beings 
remains far more unquestioned. 
 this unquestioning and unquestionability of being however, is neither simply a 
failure of Hegel’s, nor of the Phenomenology or some other text; it is ‘the still unthought 
unity of the essential nature of metaphysics’ (id 55). and the essence of this unthink-
ing (that Heidegger also calls the forgetting, Vergessenheit, of the question of being) is 
maintained by the ‘onto-theological essential-constitution of metaphysics’ (id 56, trans. 
modified).31 if Hegel then, belongs to the history of metaphysics, it is no surprise that he 
thinks theologically: ‘and god has the absolutely undisputed right that the beginning 
be made with him’—for the beginning of the system of science lies with absolute spirit 
or god understood as the being of beings, the all-highest truth and absolute ground 
(id 53-4; sl 78/gW XXi 68).32 nor is it a surprise that the Phenomenology begins with 
ontology, being in general, das Sein überhaupt, the indeterminate or simple immediacy, 
einfache Unmittelbarkeit, pure being as the essence of sense-certainty—for here all science 
says: that it is, es ist; ‘and its truth contains only the being of the thing’ (ps ¶¶ 91, 97, 99, 
trans. modified).33 But the onto-theology of metaphysics not only reduces the question of 
being to an answer (being is the ground of beings), it reduces the multiplicity of answers 
(ground understood as hen, logos, idea, hupokeimenon, substance, subject) to the one god, 
     31. see also, for example, Bt 2. Werner marx follows Heidegger in seeing Hegel’s metaphysics as part 
of the tradition of ‘logos philosophy’, that is, the thinking that begins with parmenides identification of 
thinking and being, and culminates in a ‘specifically modern version, authoritatively defined by kant’, the 
identity of subjectivity and objectivity accessible by spirit through the noesis of nous—for absolute spirit is 
nothing more than a modern avatar of aristotle’s divine ‘thought thinking thought’. thus for marx, insofar 
as the Phenomenology remains rooted in metaphysics, it is onto-theology: ‘this power of nous and the logos 
culminated, for the greeks, in a philosophy which was understood as “ontology,” as a search for the ulti-
mate categorial determinations of the existent, and likewise for those of the highest existent, theos, insofar 
as ontology was always at the same time theology’, Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. p. Heath, chicago, 
University of chicago, 1975, p. xxii.
     32. Hegel is however, critical of parmenides’ onto-theology: ‘the said reality in all realities, the being in all 
determinate being, which is supposed to express the concept of god, is nothing else than abstract being, which 
is the same as nothing’ (sl 113/gW XXi 107). on the absolute ground, see sl 67/gW XXi 55.
     33. as Heidegger notes however: ‘it still remains unthought by what unity ontologic and theologic belong 
together’ (id 60). in other words, the henology of onto-henology has yet to be thought. see also, Heidegger, 
‘Hegel and the greeks’, Pathmarks, William mcneill (ed.), cambridge, cambridge University, 1998, p. 328 
(henceforth pm). as Hyppolite writes: ‘in the Phenomenology we have seen the immediate being of the begin-
ning of the book present itself as a thing, as force, as life, and finally as spirit’, Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure 
of  Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, p. 580. For alexandre kojève, Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit is primarily 
‘phenomenological anthropology’: ‘man is what he is only to the extent that he becomes what he is; his true 
Being (Sein) is Becoming (Werden), Time, History; and he becomes, he is History only in and by Action that negates 
the given [being], the action of Fighting and of Work’, Introduction to the Reading of  Hegel, trans. J. H. nichols, 
Jr., ithaca, cornell University, 1969, p. 38. this view seems to be shared by Quentin lauer: ‘it should be 
obvious from even the very cursory account which we have been able to give of Hegel’s system that his 
philosophy, no matter what its ramifications, is essentially a philosophy of man throughout’, Hegel’s Idea of  
Philosophy, new York, Fordham University, 1983, p. 15.
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spirit as the prōtē archē, ultima ratio, causa sui—and it leaves unthought therefore, the pos-
sibility of thinking the meaning of being, in itself as well as in relation to and difference 
from beings.34
in response then, to the history of Western thought that stretches from the greeks to 
Hegel, Heidegger seeks the ground of the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics—
and he finds it in the concept of ground, that is, being qua ground. as the grounding 
of the ground, being means letting-laying-out, allowing that which is to arrive and lie 
before us, Vorliegenlassen. to ground means to be that which lets beings be there, present, 
come to the fore; grounding means letting them come over and show themselves, dis-
close themselves (as one—and thereby as they are or are not), ‘come forth from conceal-
ment into unconcealment’ (pm 333),35 alētheia—not just once, now or then, but always or 
sometimes (time), and repeatedly, continuously (aspect)—for the ground allows beings 
to remain beings, clears a place for them to endure, maintains an opening for them to 
stay that which they are throughout change and becoming. and to ground means to let 
beings be one, as they are in themselves and with others—for grounding is the event of 
gathering, being the unity (widest and highest, absolute transcendence, das transcendens 
schlechthin) of that which unifies by letting the identity and difference of being and beings 
be (id 68-69).36 thus if to be, for metaphysics, means to ground and if being is a ground, 
it is because being means grounding, unifying temporally and aspectually.37
     34. as Heidegger insists however: ‘remaining-unthought constitutes the essence of metaphysics’, ‘Hegel’s 
concept of experience’, Off the Beaten Track, trans. J. Young and k. Haynes, cambridge, cambridge Univer-
sity, 2002, p. 133. For Hegel’s discussion of plato’s onto-theology, see for example, lHp ii 60/W iXX 83.
     35. the origin of the enigma of alētheia however, as Heidegger reminds us, lies not with philosophy, but 
with poetry: ‘the oldest evidence of alētheiē and alēthēs, unconcealment and unconcealed, we find in Homer, 
and specifically in connection with verbs of saying’ (pm 334). or again: ‘alētheia comes before the history of 
philosophy’ (pm 335). For Werner marx, Hegel and Heidegger are most at odds with respect to truth: ‘the 
“truth” to which the introductory and preparatory science of phenomenology leads, in the final shape of 
absolute knowledge, consists in the dialectically assembled system of thought-determinations. this totally 
manifest truth is the last and most extreme expression of the principle of total lucidity inherent in logos and 
nous. Heidegger views the nature of truth as a process in which “hiddenness”—lethe—so passes, within a 
realm of clearing—aletheia—into “disclosure,” as to permeate the latter further in various ways’. thus, ‘if 
what is shown to knowledge or conceiving is merely a side of Being permeated by hiddenness, or actually 
“withdrawing” itself from truth proper, we then have a thought running radically counter to the possibility 
that the self-conceiving concept, the self evolving toward true knowledge, should be able to rediscover itself 
in the complete movement of thought-determinations, qua systematic truth’, Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, 
p. 107.
     36. Heidegger later notes: ‘of course not transcendens—despite every metaphysical resonance—scholastic 
and greek-platonic koinon, rather transcendence as the ecstatic-temporal [Zeitlichkeit]—temporality [Tempo-
ralitat]; but “horizon”! Being has “thought beyond” [“überdacht”] beings. However, transcendence from the 
truth of being: the event [das Ereignis]’ (Bt 38).
     37. as Heidegger writes: ‘nothing in this realm lets itself be proved, but something pointed out’ (id 22, 
trans. modified). in the Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger calls this a ‘further-hinting of a hint’, Weiterwinken 
eines Winkes—as such, and recognizing that ‘the time of “systems” is past’, it is neither purposeful nor calcu-
lative, neither individual nor communal; rather, is a ‘thinking saying of philosophy that would be attempted 
in an other beginning. this does not describe or explain, does not proclaim or teach. this does not stand 
over against what is said, but is it itself as the essential-presencing of beyng. this saying gathers beying’s 
unto a first sounding of its essence, and it itself sounds only out of this essence’, trans. p. emad and k. maly, 
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Hegel and tHe greeks 
Have we then, come to an understanding of the meaning of the new concept of be-
ing? of being as concept? or of being as ground? to the meaning of being itself? is this 
being qua being? not at all. But as Heidegger argues: ‘the new concept of being is the 
old and ancient concept in its most extreme and total completion’, its äußersten und ganzen 
Vollendung. Hegel however, conducts this crucial step: he unfolds, entfaltet, the old concept 
of being, the one as old as Western philosophy in its two main stages (parmenides/
Heraclitus, plato/aristotle)—for the fundamental motifs of phenomenology are prede-
termined, vorbestimmt, by the ancient point of departure. the Phenomenology then, is ‘the 
last stage in the possible justification’ of phenomenology (Hps 141/204-5).
in order to understand the new, we must first return to the old. Heidegger therefore 
recalls Hegel’s interpretation of the four basic words of greek philosophy: parmenides’ 
hen, Heraclitus’ logos, plato’s idea, aristotle’s energeia (pm 328). For these words ‘speak 
the language of the guiding word, “being,” einai (eon, ousia)’—and they do so within the 
horizon of being as immediate indeterminacy, that which is, the objectivity of objects, 
abstracted from its relation to the subject. in other words, being is the truth of beings, 
things; and thoughts must accord with being in order to be true. 
For parmenides then, being is one, the universal—and insofar as being and thinking 
are the same, the thought of the universal is one with that which is. Here the ‘energetic, 
impetuous soul’ strives to grasp and express being. But Hegel insists: this is not the 
indeterminate infinity, anaximander’s apeiron; it is being as the absolutely determined 
and delimited, absolut Begrenzende. and this is the beginning of idealism, the opposite of 
materialism—for being is not a being, not to be identified with a sensuous thing, but a 
concept (however indeterminate). thus being means being one; and being is one insofar 
as everything is one, hen panta, and nothing is not; so to be is to be one; beings and being 
are one, and one with thought (lHp i 250-3/W XViii 286-9; pm 329).
But for Heraclitus, being and non-being are the same. so the truth is: nothing and 
being gathered together through change, Veränderung, Bewegung—or more precisely, be-
coming, Werden, the unity of opposites insofar as everything is in flux, panta rhei. Be-
coming’s gathering of being and nothing is Heraclitus’ logos—not merely an account of 
gathering, but the gathering itself (however abstract) into a unity. so in becoming, being 
and nothing are one—for becoming is the unity of both, that is, the being of being and 
becoming; it is the ‘unity of opposite determinations’, that relation or connection, Ver-
hältnis, which allows them to be that which they are. as Hegel writes: ‘change is unity, 
relation of both to one, one being, this and the other’ (W XViii 327, trans. aH). in this 
sense, being means becoming, changing, moving, flowing; to be is to become; beings are 
insofar as they become, change from being to non-being and vice versa, from one to the 
other—for as the other of the other, das Andere des Anderen, each is also the other of itself, 
and its being consists in being this other, its other; becoming means being other. 
the essence of becoming however, for Heraclitus, is time—for time is the ‘first sensi-
Bloomington, indiana University, 1999, p. 4, trans. modified. an investigation into ‘the other beginning’ of 
the Contributions is, within the context of this article, not possible.
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ble essence’ of being, and the true essence, wahre Wesen, of being. as Hegel insists: insofar 
as becoming shows itself in being and beings, it takes the form of time, die Form der Zeit. 
indeed time is pure becoming, the essential unity of being and nothing. But this means 
that ‘in time there is no past and future, but only the now’. so to be (or not to be) in time 
is to be temporal; the unity of being empties itself out into the form of time—for as the 
essence of becoming, time is the fate and necessity, Schicksal and Notwendigkeit, heimarmenē, 
of being (lHp i 293/W XViii 337).
But however much parmenides thinks being and unity, however much Heraclitus 
thinks being and unity and time, for Hegel, they do so within the context of a philoso-
phy of nature—the activity of thought, of the subject, consciousness, self-consciousness, 
spirit, remains passive, content to read the truth of phusis like a book. reason is not free 
to think, discover, but far more shackled to the world of things. and this means ‘the 
object is for me something essentially free, and i am for myself devoid of subjectivity’, 
subjektivitätslos (lHp i 297/W XViii 342).
With plato however, a decisive step is taken: being and unity and time (and unified 
beings in time) are no longer simply functions of nature; they are ideas, principles of re-
ality. the essence of things then shows itself in consciousness, not because it belongs to 
consciousness, not as simply subjective, but as determinate for nature. Being and unity 
and time are no longer merely sensible, material, empirical, contingent; they are the 
supersensible and infinite reality of things, the intellectual or necessary ideas in which 
reality and thought are conceptualized scientifically ‘in one unity’ (lHp ii 1/W iXX 11; 
pm 330). nevertheless, the ideas are neither in some kind of transcendent other world, 
nor just imaginary; they are the ideas of things, the ideal universal look or eidos of real 
unified beings in time (that show themselves to us and that we come to know, so that 
being and thought are the same). as Hegel writes: the ideas are real; ‘they are, and 
they are alone, being’—for although being and beings exist, the truth of the later are 
determined by the ideas (lHp ii, p. 31; W 19, p. 41; trans. modified).38 thus for Hegel, 
plato’s thought is the dialectical supersession, the Aufhebung, of parmenides and Heracli-
tus: being, as the becoming of the universal and particular, is the ideal truth of beings 
insofar as they change, move, become concretely that which they are. so being is an 
idea, to be is to be ideal, and unified beings are translations of ideal forms in time—for 
the idea of the unity of being and beings, like the unifying relation of opposites, is the 
truth of both.
the negation of the sensuous however, by the ideas, means that for Hegel, plato 
cannot think the reality of the real, the truth of concrete beings qua concrete: being is an 
idea—but only an idea—and the reality of things is relative, only true in relation to the 
ideas. and it is not until aristotle’s Metaphysics, that being becomes actualized, finds its 
realization in itself as end, the telos of entelecheia that is the logos. Here being shows itself in 
beings, not merely as potential, dynamis, but as actual, energeia; not just in the capacity for 
     38. as Hegel later writes: ‘it is rather the ideal that is the most real, and it was plato who perceived that it 
was the only real, for he characterized the universal or thought as the true, in opposition to what is sensu-
ous’ (lHp ii 50/W iXX 63).
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self-determination, but in the concrete self-realization of the idea. the idea is actualized 
however, only insofar as it is the cause of being and unity, beings and unities. But cause 
must be understood here not simply as causa—for although aitia means that for the sake 
of which something is or is done, the reasons or grounds or ends; its primary sense is that 
of a charge, crimen, accusation, guilt, fault, or that which is responsible, so responsibility. 
and metaphysics is here knowledge of the aitia of the whole of being, the totality of be-
ings, that which is universally responsible for the universe—but the aitia must be prōta; 
the charges must be firsts, origins. so for first philosophy, prōtē philosophia, responsibility 
means: being first, an origin, the origin of that which is, the origin of being. and be-
ing means being charged with being responsible, being implicated in a crime, or by an 
event, something made or done, poiein or prattein (pm 330-1; lHp ii 149/W iXX 134).
if there is then, a science of being qua being, of that which is, insofar as it is; it must 
seek that which is responsible for being, for it being that which it is, and which is impli-
cated in beings. But what is responsible for being? as aristotle insists: it cannot simply 
be the substrate, ground-work, hupokeimenon—but if being is spoken in many ways, they 
all point to ousia, substance, as primary essence and cause.39 in this way, ousia is the 
‘what’, ti, of a being, that which something is propter se, in-itself, kath’ hauto—not acci-
dentally, but necessarily, actually—and this is expressed by its formula, logos, that is, its 
definition, horismos, that which makes it a unified being, this and not that, particular and 
concrete. and ousia is responsible for being, charged with being implicated in beings, for 
actualizing their potential, for being the final cause of being’s becoming that which it 
essentially is. in this way, the aitia are not simply ideas, but the real causes of reality, the 
origins of beings. thus for aristotle, being is responsible for beings, for realizing their 
essence, and as such it takes responsibility for itself.
so being means ousia—for ‘the question which was raised of old and is raised now 
and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, 
what is substance?’40 and what about ousia? For it is as well. so the discussion of ousia 
means that metaphysics must return to the question of the meaning of being, ti to on. 
and here aristotle gives us a clue—for he insists: ‘being and unity are the same and of 
one nature insofar as they are implied in one another as origin and cause’.41
indeed, on the one hand, everything that holds for being holds for unity: the theory 
of one is that of the other; the investigation of being, of being qua being, is just as much 
the investigation of unity, of unity qua unity; the aporia of one is that of the other. and if 
being is said in many ways, likewise for unity, pollachōs legetai. as aristotle writes:
     39. Meta., 1004b9, 1028a15. in fact, for aristotle, there are four original aitia, four charges, a four-fold re-
sponsibility at the origin: substance, ousia, the logos, that through which it is that which it is; the matter and 
substratum, hulē and hupokeimenon; the origin or beginning of movement, hē archē tēs kinēseōs, that good for 
the sake of which something is, the end of generation and movement, telos. these four are responsible for 
nature, for physical beings, Phys. 194b16. But here they are charged with being responsible for the universe, 
the whole; and they are implicated in everything mortal and immortal, in being and becoming, that which 
is, was and will be, everywhere and in everyway, as well as in our scientific investigation of beings, episkepsin 
tōn ontōn, Meta. 983b2.
     40. Meta. 1028b2-4.
     41. Meta. 1003b22-4; trans. modified.
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for ‘one man’ and ‘man’ are the same thing, and so are ‘existent man’ and ‘man’ 
and the doubling of the words in ‘one man and one existent man’ does not express 
anything different (it is clear that the two things are not separated [ou chōrizetai] 
either in coming to be or in ceasing to be); and similarly ‘one existent man’ adds 
nothing to ‘existent man’, so that it is obvious that the addition in these cases 
means the same thing, and unity is nothing apart from being; and if, further, the 
substance of each thing is one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from 
its very nature something that is:—all this being so, there must be exactly as many 
species of being as of unity.42  
the science of the Metaphysics then, is neither simply ontology nor henology—for first 
philosophy is onto-henology; and if the question of the meaning of being has been for-
gotten, then so too has the question of the meaning of unity.43
on the other hand, they have different logoi: the meaning of being is ousia; the mean-
ing of unity is horismos. indeed beings are insofar as they have the character of apartness, 
separability, determinability, limitability, boundary, finitude, chōriston, thisness, whole-
ness, particularity, indivisibility, individuality, tode ti.44 a being’s essence is propter se, in-
itself, kath’ hauto—necessarily, not accidentally—so that ‘whatness’ is expressed in its 
formula or definition, logos (for example, the human as zoōn logon echon, rational animal); 
but a horizon then separates, chōrizō, one being from another, gives each being a place 
to be, chōra, that which it is, and allows for transition, translation, change, movement, 
becoming. and not only does a being have its horizon, but its horizon too, insofar as it 
is, has its horizon, the horizon of the horizon. and so too with the horizon of ousia. thus 
ousia can be the meaning of being, that which to on is kath’ hauto, because unity means 
horizon.
But what then is the relation of being and unity? as aristotle insists: they imply one 
another—for being follows from unity, and unity from being, just as essence and horizon 
are bed-fellows that walk the same path. and as co-implicated origins and causes, being 
and unity are responsible for the being and unity of beings and unities. then charged 
with this responsibility, the most responsible of all responsibilities, there is no presump-
tion of innocence; rather their responsibility is prior to all innocence, to any admission 
of innocence or guilt; they are most guilty of all (or most innocent), guilty prior. to any 
guilt, and the charge is undeniable—for at the moment it is made, they have already 
confessed; and before anything is implied, they have already implicated each other.
tHe implication oF Being
implication then, from the greeks to Hegel, is the new old metaphysical concept of 
being, and of unity. and not just—for time is the unity, that is, the horizon of being; and 
     42. Meta. 1003b26-34.
     43. Meta. 1004a22; see also: 998b20ff, 1001a5-6, 1030b10-11. For the forgetting of being, see Bt xixff. 
     44. Meta. 1052b16ff. and even the divine, the prime mover, unmovable and non-sensible substance, 
thought thinking thought, is only insofar as it is a unity—for its infinity is that finitude or horizon which 
separates it from mortals. see Meta., Bk. Xii. Furthermore, if unity is the metron by which beingscan be 
quantitatively or qualitatively measured, it is because unity is essentially already horizon.
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aspect is the being, that is, essence of unity. to be means to be one because being im-
plies unity; but being is that which it is, namely being, only because unity implies it. and 
so aspect (complete or incomplete, incompletely complete or completely incomplete) is 
the horizon of unity; just as time is the essence of being. in this way, the science of meta-
physics shows itself as the science of implication, akolouthology; it is the investigation of 
following, attending, not leading, of determining that and how to follow, and not; as well 
as the study of how implications cannot be followed, if they are to imply, how an essen-
tial ambiguity characterizes implication itself.45 so onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology 
attends to the implications of being and unity, time and aspect.
What then is this new old concept of being? it is implication. to be means to imply; 
for being is implicating; being is implication. and insofar as being and unity are the 
same thing and of one nature, unity too is implication; uniting is implicating, to unify is 
to imply. But so too with time and aspect—for being and unity are implied temporally 
and aspectually. and therefore beings can be united in time and with aspect.
But what is the meaning of implication? perhaps an example will help: ēthos anthrōpō 
daimōn.46 How can we translate Heraclitus? mckirahan writes: ‘a person’s character is 
his divinity’.47 kahn: ‘man’s character is his fate’. kirk, raven and schofield: ‘man’s 
character is his daimon’.48 Heidegger: ‘the (familiar) abode is for man the open region for 
the presencing of god (the unfamiliar one)’.49 all of these translations are clearly ‘right’, 
but none of them follows the greek closely enough.50
more literally, the words say: ‘character human’s divine’, or switching word order, 
‘human’s character divine’. But what has happened to being here? For in this transla-
     45. elsewhere i have suggested that the essence of this ambiguity must be understood as ‘uncertainty’; see 
The Irony of  Heidegger, especially secs. 1.1, 1.2, 2.2, 2.5, 5.2, 6.2. For a modern scientific understanding of im-
plication, see for example, p. grice, Studies in the Way of  Words, cambridge, Harvard University, 1989. Here 
grice is primarily concerned with how ‘information’ in conventional or nonconventional conversational 
‘implicatures’ might be controlled (according to a kind of ‘cooperative principle’ indebted to kantian cat-
egories) so that which is meant or suggested—in spite of all irony, metaphor, ambiguity—‘must be capable 
of being worked out’, p. 31.
     46. Fr. 119, stobaeus anth. iV, 40, 23, in The Presocratic Philosophers, g. s. kirk, J. e. raven, m. schofield 
(eds.), cambridge, cambridge University, 1957, p. 210.
     47. patricia curd (ed.), A Presocratics Reader, trans. richard d. mckirahan, indianapolis, Hackett, 1996, p. 
40; emphasis added.
     48. The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 211; emphasis added.
     49. martin Heidegger, ‘letter on Humanism’, Basic Writings, d. F. krell (ed.), new York, Harper & row, 
1977, p. 234; emphasis added.
     50. as Walter Benjamin insists: Heidegger’s thought, in spite of ‘all its philosophical packaging’, is basically 
‘only a piece of good translating work’, The Correspondence of  Walter Benjamin, chicago, University of chicago, 
1994, p. 168. Here however, perhaps what is needed is something more akin to the interlinear version of the 
holy text; or, as Benjamin writes, citing pannwitz: ‘our translators, even the very best ones, proceed from 
a wrong premise. they want to turn Hindi, greek, english into german instead of turning german into 
Hindi, greek, english. our translators have a far greater reverence for the usage of their own language 
than for the spirit of the foreign works… the basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in 
which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the for-
eign tongue’, ‘the task of the translator’, pp. 261-2. thanks to Helen lambert for reminding me of this.
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tion (or non-translation, mistranslation), in what appears as a grammatically erroneous 
chop-slop string of words, being seems to disappear. Has being then, in fact, disap-
peared? must we think and speak and act without being? is it absent or hiding? and is 
our task then to make it present or revealed? to allow it to show itself?
let us rather take a clue from the philologists who remind us: being is implied—it is 
not merely left out; it was never ‘there’ to begin with, although nor was it ‘not there’. and 
this is not just negative, as if being is subtracted, erased, nor a negation of the negation 
that restores or supersedes, nor simply a privation. But nor is it a positing—for being as 
implication cannot appear or show itself as being, at least without becoming that which 
it is not.
so granted: our translation fails to do justice to the greek, whether grammatically 
correct or incorrect. phenomenology is akolouthology insofar as it embraces this failure, 
and attempting to bring it to light, fails to do so. if being is a concept, it is only an im-
plied concept; if it is a ground, only an implied ground. For we are charged with being 
responsible for this failure, and implicated in the crimes of metaphysics.
the task remains: to think being as implication, as well as unity and time and as-
pect. 
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